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Truth and Sight: generalising without universalising 
Maurice Bloch 
 
Abstract: This article examines the link between truth and sight, and the implications 
of this link for our understandings of the concept of evidence. I propose to give an 
example of precisely how we might attempt to generalise about a phenomena such as 
the recurrence of the association between truth and sight without ignoring important 
anti-universalist points.  In doing this, I hope to give one example of how 
anthropology, in the original sense of the term, is a still possible enterprise, in spite of 
the criticisms such an approach has had to face in the last thirty years. 
 
The English word evidence is based on the Latin verb videre: to see. Familiar phrases, 
such as ‘seeing is believing’ or the assurance that something must be true because ‘I 
saw it with my own eyes,’ are everywhere.  Such observations and many others all 
bear witness to a well-established European connection between seeing and truth 
which, as the Shorter Oxford Dictionary tells us, is so often associated with evidence.   
Such a link seems very ancient. Thus Thucidides says that, in contrast to that based on 
hearsay, the only true history is that based on the authority of sight (autopsia) ‘of the 
two ways of knowing, through the eye and the ear, only the former gives us a true 
picture’ because accounts based on memory distort and lie1.  St Paul, for his part, in a 
famous Platonic mood, makes the same equation when he tells us of the dark glass, 
which, by interfering with our sight, keeps us from the full truth.  The idea that seeing 
is a guarantee of truth continues in less ancient times.  Thus, the greater truthfulness 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Gerard Lenclud for drawing my attention to this quotation. 
of what is seen  over what is reported through language is a major theme in the 
writings of Augustine (Stock 1996), Bacon, Hume, Condillac (Roos 1999) and the 
empiricist/sensationalist philosophers generally all make the point. This type of 
argument is found, with modifications, in Kant. In a completely different way writers 
such as Broca, after having noted the prominence of the lower brain in non-human 
primates, especially the olfactory bulb, see evolution as the progress of the 
development of ‘higher’ senses, above all sight, over ‘lower’ senses, especially smell 
(Dias  2004).     
But, what do such recurrences of an association between truth and sight mean for the 
anthropologist? Are they more than a manifestation of a particular turn of our own 
culture, which, once again, we might naively take to be universal?  Such a classic 
form of professional scepticism does not, at first, seem to be born out by a cursory 
inspection of the ethnographic record. In an article, to which I return below, Tyler 
(1984) informs us that the association of truth and sight recurs in all Indo-European 
languages, including Hittite and also in many other language families. Ranging even 
more widely the comparative linguist A. Viberg sees the association as extremely 
common in all languages (Viberg  2001). Certainly, a random trawl through 
ethnographic sources comes up with many examples from all over the world. Thus A. 
Strathern (1975) and J. Robbins (2001) tell us that the New Guinea Islanders they 
studied are obsessed with the unreliability of language and, while at the same time, 
stress the truth of knowledge obtained through sight.  Similarly A-C Taylor confirms 
that the Amazonian Achuars are similar2.  M. Izard also tells me that much the same 
is true of the Mossi of Burkina Faso3.  According to Pinney (this volume) Indian 
                                                 
2 Personal communication. 
3 Personal communication. 
Nationalists, the British Colonial administration and the old lady in the film 
convinced that photographs show Gods who are real are all influenced in their attitude 
to photography by the belief that what the lens sees is so. 
 
There are some dissenting voices however, that give examples where sight is not 
linked to the notion of truth.  A number of anthropologists claim to provide 
ethnographic cases which purport to show that, among this or that group, another 
sense, usually hearing, is valued above vision  (Feld 1982, Gell 1995, Tyler 1994)4.   
The question of the relative significance of the different senses has also come up in 
the scholarly tradition. Some, especially those eighteenth century philosophers who 
engaged with Molineux’s problem (would a man, blind from birth, who had then been 
cured, recognise through sight, objects which he had only felt before his cure?), most 
notably Diderot in  the Lettre sur les Aveugles, tangled endlessly with the question of 
the relation and hierarchy of touch and sight.  
 
The presence of possible exceptions, based on a few exotic ethnographies, which are 
then used as negative evidence against an assumed universality, is a familiar form of 
argument in anthropology. Such rhetoric was the cause of the popularity of work such 
                                                 
4 I have to admit a certain scepticism as to how far the particular claims of Gell and Feld are based on a 
general ranking of hearing over sight within these cultures and not simply on certain contextually 
specific evaluations, for example hunting in dense forests or the typical New Guinea association of 
unseen birds with ancestors. In any case it is not clear how far these authors intend to push their 
argument.  Such hesitation on the other hand does not apply to the most categorical of the 
anthropologists.  Stephen Tyler, in an article already referred to, and which ironically supplies us with a 
great number of examples of the coupling of truth and sight, nevertheless concludes that : “the 
hegemony of the visual is not universal”  and that empiricism as a folk theory is a peculiarity of certain 
grammars.  The counter example he gives to set against the mass of the visualists, whom he dismisses, 
are the speakers of Dravidian languages.  His evidence is based on a form of primitive Whorfian 
examination of Dravidian verbs for knowing, which are taken to offer an easy window to thought.  But, 
even if we accept his epistemology, there are serious reasons to doubt what he says about this particular 
example.  Thus, in a personal communication, Nathaniel Roberts tells me that in Tamil, the most 
spoken Dravidian language, the word most used for "to know" is theriyum [root form: theri],  for which 
the standard modern Tamil dictionary in the first place defines: 1) be visible; be seen 2) (of eyes) see; 
to perform the function of seeing. 
as that of Margaret Mead.  Indeed, it might seem that the only defence against such 
negative argument is, either to challenge the reliability of the supposed exception, as 
was famously done by Derek Freeman (1983), or to broaden and weaken the claim to 
universality.  Thus, we might modify the proposition that sight is always associated 
with truth to one that merely claims an association between truth and knowledge 
through the senses in general.  However, even such a less specific claim would also be 
vulnerable in a different and more fundamental way, in much the way that all 
generalisations in kinship theory have been attacked (Needham 1971; Bloch and 
Sperber 2002) by pointing out the obvious fact that the details of every ethnographic 
case are different. Lumping these cases together would thus be a case of petitio petitii, 
an example of mere reductionism, where it seems that a universal category is created 
when in fact the cases only have in common what the definition created by the 
observer has arbitrarily decided is significant. 
 
These are familiar ways in which generalising claims in anthropology have been 
attacked and they are not without basis. Such destructive tactics have been effective to 
such an extent that many in the discipline have abandoned all attempts at grand theory 
and shudder at any claims that anything non-particularistic could exist in cultural 
phenomena.  However, the problem with such timid nihilism is that the prominence of 
recurrences in the ethnographic record, such as the association of truth and sight, can 
only be ignored through acts of blatant theoretical bad faith. But, given the soundness 
of the objections, we are left with the question of what are we to do about them.  
 
In this short paper I propose to give an example of precisely how we might attempt to 
generalise about a phenomena such as the non-universal but frequent recurrence of the 
association between truth and sight without ignoring the important anti-universalist 
points referred to above. In doing this, I hope to give one example of how 
anthropology, in the original sense of the term, is still a possible enterprise, in spite of 
the criticisms such an approach has had to face in the last thirty years . But, before 




During a recent period of research in the remote Zafimaniry village in Madagascar 
where I have been working for so long, I tried out a new research strategy, new for a 
social anthropologist at least, in order to understand what might be called ‘Zafimaniry 
ethno-psychology’.  This consisted in demonstrating in front of my fellow villagers a 
well-known psychological experiment concerned with the cognitive development of 
children.  This was in order to hear how the adults interpreted what they saw their 
children doing, as they observed the tasks they were asked to do. In other words, I put 
ordinary people, who had never heard the word psychology and who, for the most 
part, could neither read nor write, in the position in which professional psychologists 
normally place themselves. 
 
The experiment referred to is called the ‘false belief task’.  It has been considered in 
cognitive psychology as being of great significance since it seems to reveal a critical 
moment in the development of the child’s cognitive development.  The false belief 
task, in the version I used, consists in asking a child where a person who saw an 
object placed under one hat, will look for it when they return after a spell outside the 
house, during which period the subject has seen the object being switched to another 
hiding place by the experimenter.  Adults and children over the age of six normally 
say that the person will look for the object under the hat where the person saw it 
placed before they left the house, but where they therefore know it is not anymore.  
This is taken to mean that they understand that the person who left the house holds a 
false belief. Young children, by contrast, say that the person returning will look for 
the object at the place where it actually is.  In most of the psychological literature at 
least, this is usually taken to mean that the young child has not yet understood that 
other people act in terms of what they believe the world to be; a notion that is 
obviously necessary for someone to realise that others could hold false beliefs about 
the world.  Such a difference between the older children who rightly predict that the 
person will look where they believe the object is and the younger ones who predict the 
person will look for the object where it actually is, is striking and thought provoking. 
It raises much broader questions, concerned not only with child development, but also 
about what our understanding of others and their minds requires in order to act 
competently in the social world.  
 
It is precisely because this experiment raises such fundamental questions and because 
reflecting on its significance leads to such fundamental reflection about the human 
mind and the nature of human sociability, that it seemed interesting to see how the 
Malagasy villagers would rise to the challenge.  I thus used the Zafimaniry witnesses 
of the experiment and their surprise at the difference between the responses of the 
younger and older children to trigger wide-ranging discussions on, among other 
things, the nature of thought and language, child development and the cognitive 
differences between humans and other animals. These discussions took the form of 
animated conversations in which all sorts of ideas were aired.  Certain of the musings 
of the villagers were expressed with a good deal of hesitation and others were much 
contested. Some propositions, however, came loud and clear and were acknowledged 
as obviously right by everybody present. It is only these that I consider here. 
 
Among these broadly agreed propositions was the idea that thought was, at bottom, a 
matter of organising action so that it achieves desired ends.  In the villagers’ view two 
things follow from this pragmatic way of understanding mind.  First, non-human 
animals are as capable of thought as humans; since pigs, for example, will think of 
turning up during the preparation of food in order to eat what peelings might be 
available, and since fleas will think of hiding in the seams of clothing in order not to 
be caught.  Secondly, and this follows inevitably from the previous point, the villagers 
were quite clear that thought is independent of language, since they well know that 
animals strategise their actions but do not talk5.   
 
However, my informants did not undervalue language for all that. They were adamant 
that language was a key factor in the superiority of humans over animals.  Their 
affirmation in this matter led me to ask them what was language for, if it was not, as 
they asserted, necessary for thought.  The answer that was invariably given is that 
language enables humans to lie. According to Zafimaniry theory, speech, and lying, 
which speech renders possible, is an extra technique, not available to animals but 
available to humans, that enables adults to obtain by means of deceit what they have 
desired in their thoughts. Furthermore, and in response to the experiment, the villagers 
also argued that this refined technology for Machiavellian gratification, not possible 
for animals, is also not available to very young humans, since infants obviously do not 
                                                 
5 This work is on ongoing but for a somewhat fuller discussion of this material see Bloch 2006 
know how to speak.  Language is something that develops as human children mature 
and learn. Such reasoning was the basis of the villagers’ interpretation of the false 
belief task in terms of lying. It explains why young children, like animals, cannot lie 
because they do not yet have language, or, at least, sufficient control over language.    
Infants fail the false belief task because they have not yet reached the developmental 
stage when they so control language that they are able to lie. This is an ability that 
requires, in the first place, an understanding that others can hold false beliefs since 
otherwise there would not be any point in lying6.  
 
The villagers also made clear that such ideas about language, motivation and thought 
have important further implications.  The first concerns their description of the 
experience of the social.  The second concerns the experiential side of evidence.  I 
take these two in turn.  
 
In the discussions that followed the observation of the false belief task, the social was 
described as a dangerous and exiting matter.  It involves living among chattering 
individuals who, like you, are seeking to further their own ends by fair means or foul, 
and who therefore use all the tools available as speaking human adults. This makes 
normal life risky because it involves being among people endowed with, and indeed 
continually using, their capacity for lying. At every step, therefore, there is a danger 
that one acts in terms of a world that is false. This feeling is often expressed in the 
fear that those who falsely profess to love you might, really, be trying to poison you.  
 
                                                 
6 This point requires further elaboration not possible here. 
Secondly, since it is assumed that pragmatic deceit is the default form of social life, 
this makes claiming truthfulness for what one is saying no trivial matter; therefore 
doing so must be clearly distinguished from the everyday.  This leads to a continual 
emphasis in discourse which makes clear that normal interchange is not strongly 
claiming that what one is proposing is true, so that, when one will actually want to 
claim truthfulness for one’s declaration, these will really stand out from normal 
dialogue.  This attitude has the effect that, for example, when one is asking for 
information, the most common answer is a semi indignant asa: ‘search me’, followed 
for greater emphasis by tsy fantatro :  ‘I don’t know’ and then… the information 
requested is offered.  Similarly, this information when it is finally volunteered is 
either preceded or followed by the word angamba  meaning ‘perhaps’. 
 
All this tentativeness can thus then contrast with those moments when one does want 
to be believed categorically. I may want to say ‘There really is a mad dog in the 
village!’  To do this one can either follow the assertion by the word: Marina, usually 
and appropriately translated as: ‘It’s true’ or, for even greater claim to truth say ‘Hita 
maso!’, lit. ‘It was seen by my own eyes!’ 
 
The Zafimaniry, and all the Malagasy I know, are thus yet another example of the 
many people around the world who associate statements claiming the authority of 
sensations, and especially sight, as being powerful evidence of truthfulness.  But their 
discussions following their observations of the false belief task takes us even further.  
They willingly explained why sight is so important: this is because it is verification 
which avoids the treacherousness of language used in social life, since social life is a 
matter of dealing with speaking individuals who can hide the truth in order to further 
their own ends and trick you. The Zafimaniry thus, continually, implicitly and 
explicitly, operate a strong contrast between information obtained through ordinary 
speech, which they rhetorically mark as uncertain, and which they associate with 
lying, and information obtained through the sense of sight.  
 
But why do they use knowledge through the senses, and sight in particular7, to 
contrast with the treachery of the social?  The answer is implicit in all their discussion 
of language.  What they seem to be saying is that: via language, truth is vitiated by 
Machiavellian social intentionality.  Sight, on the other hand, as it is thought about in 
Zafimaniry theory—if one can call ideas that are usually only implicit ‘theory’—does 
not involve the dangerous imagined intentionality projected by the source of 
knowledge.  What one sees has no intention to represent itself, falsely or otherwise; 
one may mistake what one sees but that’s your fault, not, as in the case of linguistic 




The question, however, which the above suggests is the following.  Even if my 
interpretation of what the Zafimaniry told me in response to their witnessing the false 
belief task is accurate, why should that tell us anything about human beings in 
general, the definitional aim of anthropological theory? Is the above simply one more 
local theory, to be added to the stamp collection of local representations which 
anthropology sometime seems to see as its only purpose?   
 
                                                 
7 It is probably because language is associated with hearing that sight is usually favoured over hearing, 
the only other serious contender among the senses as the source of complex wide-ranging information. 
As a first step in arguing against such a typically frequent pessimistic conclusion, we 
should, first of all, remind ourselves of the problem of recurrence which such 
insistence on the uniqueness of each case creates for a culturalist approach.  If we take 
the particularistic stance this becomes incomprehensible.  Indeed, the similarity of 
discourses in the different ethnographic cases to which I refer is even greater than 
suggested at first.  It is not only that we find, again and again, an association between 
sight and truth, we also find this associated with the distrust of what one might call 
‘hearsay evidence’, for the reason that this may be vitiated by the treacherous 
intentionality which characterises ordinary social life.  In other words lying is linked, 
as it is so clearly for the Zafimaniry, to what the philosophers call theory of mind, the 
continual reading of intentionality which human communication uniquely implies and 
which ultimately makes deceit easily possible. Furthermore, this potential 
treacherousness is most often seen as the product of the capacity for language that 
makes lying possible.   
 
Thus, we cannot ignore the fact that so many people, in different cultures all around 
the world, are saying similar things again and again. Such recurrences are a challenge 
that anthropology should not dodge by finding occasional counter examples.  
 
Then, there is another type of recurrence.  What ordinary people argue, according to 
ethnographic reports, such as the one I briefly supplied above for the Zafimaniry, is 
interestingly very close to a set of very differently styled propositions that are not the 
product of ethnographic interpretation but are typical of the theories of some 
evolutionary scientists reflecting on human sociability and language. 
 
Evolutionary theory has again and again stressed the problem caused by the potential 
which theory of mind, human intentionality and human language creates by making 
deceit so easy.  There is no place here to discuss this massive literature which stresses 
the point that the supremely well adapted tool for human sociability—language—
creates at the same time and by its very nature, a major problem for individual 
members of a community in that it places them at risk of being misled.  Scholars of 
many different kinds see the awareness and significance of this fact as central. This 
fundamental point is found in the work of many anthropologists (Bateson 1951, 
Rappaport 1971,Cosmides and Tooby 1992,  Knight 1998, Sperber 2001),  leading 
biologists and theoreticians of evolution (Waddington 1960, Dawkins and Krebs 
1974;  Krebs and Dawkins 1984;  Maynard-Smith & Harper 1995), linguists (Lyons 
1977; Dessalles 2000) to name only a few.  The views expressed are varied, but like 
the Zafimaniry all these writers are agreed that the complexity created by our ability 
to read other minds; that which makes language use possible (Sperber and Wilson  
1995), exposes adult members of the species to a risk which only exists to a limited 
extent for other animals, if at all; that of being misled by conspecifics and thereby 
acting against one’s own interest.  
 
We might conclude from this massive scholarly endorsement of Zafimaniry theory, 
that, in this matter, there is little to be said other than that the villagers are right. But, 
if this is so, it raises a fascinating question. How can this agreement have come about 
given the totally different circumstances and contexts in which scholars and, in the 
case of the Zafimaniry, unschooled shifting cultivators live? 
 
The answer must be that there is something in the human condition that is accessible 
to the understanding of different members of the human species irrespective of 
history, living in however different circumstances around the globe, which produces 
cognate representations. In this case, it means that the experience and the awareness 
of the experience of social life and its dangers, of human intentionality and of the 
reading of human intentionality, is, in this most fundamental aspect, universal. To 
assume this implies that the representations people have are about this something: the 
dangers of living among communicative intentional beings, and that this same thing 
exists independently of the representations people have of it. And, indeed, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to imagine a human group unconcerned with deceit and lying. 
Of course, this does not mean that the representations of the dangers of language, 
deceit and lying are determined by what they are about. It would be as wrong to forget 
the specificities of each case as to forget the recurrences. Inevitably cultural, historical 
and personal circumstances will lead to variation in styles, directions and contents.  
How far purely intellectual speculation on this matter is pushed does also vary.  For 
example, scientists are professionally trained to push their reflection, and some groups 
of people, amongst whom I would include the Zafimaniry, seem to have developed a 
greater aesthetic orientation towards theoretical speculation than others. There is room 
for much variation. It is possible that the kind of speculation I have been talking about 
is totally absent in some cases.  This, however, would not invalidate the argument I 
am developing, simply because these exceptions would not remove the existence of 
frequent recurrences. But, in spite of variation all this theorising, when it occurs, is 
about the universal awareness of the same thing. And, this awareness of this thing is 
sufficiently constraining to the images that can be produced to cope with it that 
frequent similarities in representations will occur.  This is what explains the 
recurrences. But, because the process of representation is also affected by other 
important factors: cultural, historical etc.,  we will only have family likenesses among 
the representations of this same awareness. 
 
The commonality of these representations has a further cultural implication that, this 
time, has a practical side to it. The awareness of the potential treacherousness of the 
social and of the tool which language offers for deceit is recognised in all the 
ethnographic cases cited not just as a subject of speculation but also as a major 
political problem and a threat to in-group sociability.  As a result, various practices 
and institutions are developed explicitly in order to cope with this threat, of which 
legal devices, such as those discussed by Good in this volume, are the most obvious 
example.  And, in parallel, the specificity of the threat of deceit that exists in language 
leads to the development and the valuing of devices and ideas for guaranteeing 
truthful knowledge that is not caught in the web of human intentionality and speech.  
 
This is the explanation for the recurrence that this essay seeks to explain: the 
association of truth and the senses and more particularly sight.  With the type of 
psychology the awareness of deceit creates, the idea that what is seen is more truthful 
than what is reported in speech seems an obvious way to go in order to by-pass human 
intentionality and deceit.  Again we have a weak form of determinism.  The total 
causal path is the following. The reality of the human social and the potential of 
human language leads necessarily to an awareness of the dangers of deceit and lying. 
This universal awareness strongly influences the representations we find of the social, 
language and deceit, hence the recurrences. These types of representations regularly 
predispose, but not necessarily always, to the association linking truth and sight.  It is 
thus not surprising that this particular path is so often chosen, though, of course, there 
might well be cases where it is refused. 
 
And we can go even further in the line of weak determinism that has guided me 
throughout this essay.  Another case of recurrence, which the ethnographic record 
throws up, can be seen to have the same root.  This is the similarity the techniques of 
divination found in so many places around the world display.  These very commonly 
involve techniques for producing truthful propositions that, unlike other forms of 
telling, do not involve language and its inevitable corollary, human intentionality.  
The famous techniques of Azande divination are of this type, as are such practices as 
tea leaf reading, astrology and many others.  The point about all these is that they use 
devices which produce truthful answers that are the fruit of a form of causation, such 
as physiological configuration, in the case of the reading of entrails, or physics, in the 
case of throwing stones in the air, that avoid social causation. (This, of course, creates 
the well known problem that the answers must then be interpreted and translated by 
humans who re-introduce intentionality and hence fallibility.)  Such divination 
techniques seem to tell the truth through what can be seen in states of affairs not 
brought about by the intentionality of human minds and thus implicitly recognise the 
dangers of the social and of human language with its potential for lies.   
 
This seems to be, in part, what Holbraad (this volume) seems to be arguing for Cuban 
divination that, like Azande divination, is also taken by its practitioners as truth telling 
by definition.  According to Holbraad divination is ontologically creative, a process 
that seems somewhat mysterious if ontology is taken to mean an exhaustive account 
of the world as it is. If that is so, it is difficult to understand how it could be added to.  
However, the sheer demonstration of an effect that seems purely the product of the 
naïve laws of physics that, as we know (Spelke, Phillips and Woodward 1995), we 
innately recognise as necessarily true, seems a more convincing explanation of the 
feeling of ontological certainty than Holbraad is describing. The revelation of 
divination would thus seem to be, for the practitioners, a peep at the world as it 
appears to the senses, in contrast to the treacherous representations peddled by others. 
 
Interestingly the truth telling powers of divination seem to have similar basis as the 
naïve attitudes to photography discussed by Pinney where, at first, all sorts of people 
were convinced that cameras told the truth because they were machines; in other 
words, because human intentionality was not involved in their powers of 
representation. 
 
Here again the line of causation, from the shadowy awareness of the nature of the 
social and of the implications of the human mind to actual practices seems a tempting 
and, therefore, frequently followed path.  But, for all that, it is not a necessary path, 
nor is it a rigidly mapped out one.  Thus, if divination techniques are commonly 
similar, they are also each and every one different, and there may well be societies 
where such techniques are totally absent.  This variation and occasional absence, 
however, would not contradict the kind of argument I have been developing here.  As 
so many anthropologists rightly, if somewhat trivially, insist, the social world we live 
in is the product of dialogue, of discourse, of culture, etc. But this does not mean that 
these dialogues, discourses and cultures are not about something which people, 
thankfully to a certain extent apprehend and this something as the psychologist 
Gibson stressed, itself suggests non-random affordances that are, again and again, 
represented.   
 
But there is more to this question than simply the constraints that come from what the 
representations concern.  The ability to read each other’s minds and the dangers this 
creates is a fundamental matter for the adaptation of Homo sapiens. This ability 
necessarily evokes the ideas about the dangers about deceit that concern my Malagasy 
informants and evolutionary psychologists.  However, unlike theory of mind itself, 
which can operate below the level of consciousness, and usually does, knowledge 
about deceit and lying needs to be, and evidently is, available to consciousness, if 
only so that it can be guarded against.  This is clearly of crucial importance for all 
who live in a human type society and therefore it is quite likely that, as the 
evolutionary psychologists argue, we are probably innately predisposed to detect 
cheaters.  But even if this is so, such ability, however, cannot be just automatic since 
it requires consequent conscious protective actions which, I would argue, are likely to 
be organised in dedicated institutions.  These include, among others, the ones 
mentioned above: certain divination techniques and legal systems. 
 
This long and tentative line of causation is the story that can explain the familiar mix 
of recurrences and variations that I have been concerned with throughout this essay.  
The universal consciousness of the presence of lying and deceit in society logically 
implies the possibility that people can hold false beliefs.  This awareness can be, and 
often is, used as a handle for creating, in varying degrees of elaboration, a 
representation of the mechanisms of the nature of mind, a representation that is 
constrained both by what mind is like and by our social need to be on guard against 
lying.  Peeping at the mind by using the handle of mistaken knowledge is what the 
inventors of the false belief task intended to do and it is also what the Zafimaniry and 
the people from the other ethnographic cases evoked seem to be doing when, for 
example, observing the experiment, and also in many other moments of their lives, 
they try to explain the difference between the younger and the older children.  
Knowledge of lying and deceit is thus only a handle, however it is only a handle 
hence the relative variation, but it is a good handle that we may be predisposed to use, 
hence the recurrences and the profundity of the reflection. 
 
And this sort of weak determination works the other way too. The consciousness of 
the problem of deceit, so often carrying with it an associated and over-determined 
theory of mind, leads to recurrences in institutional means to enforce the truth and 
also to imaginative speculation about what might establish truth.  These speculations, 
in turn, lead to recurrent rhetorical formulations such as: ‘It’s true, I saw it with my 
own eyes!’ or in Malagasy, considerably more elegantly,  ‘Hita maso!’.  
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